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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
“I think credibility is always an issue. . . . I do think credibility is always an issue as well
as bias,” the district court observed at one point in the jury trial of Michael Theron Hayes. (See
Tr., p.550, L.25 – p.551, L.2.) However, the district court prevented Mr. Hayes from presenting
evidence relevant to his credibility, and evidence relevant to the State’s witnesses’ motive to lie.
The district court also allowed the State to inquire into specific instances of Mr. Hayes’ prior
conduct that were not relevant to his character for untruthfulness.
In this appeal from Mr. Hayes’ conviction for one count of felony battery on a
correctional officer, Mr. Hayes raises three issues: (1) the district court erred when it declined to
issue subpoenas directing Mr. Hayes’ medical providers to testify on his behalf; (2) the district
court erred when it allowed the State, during cross-examination of Mr. Hayes, to inquire into
specific instances of his past conduct that were not relevant to his character for untruthfulness;
and (3) the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Hayes’ motion for a new trial,
on the basis the district court erred as a matter of law when it prohibited Mr. Hayes from asking
questions related to prison guidelines that were relevant to whether the State’s witnesses had a
motive to lie.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On November 10, 2015, Mr. Hayes, a sixty-year-old inmate at the Idaho Maximum
Security Institution, had an infraction hearing. (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.23, 16.)1 During the hearing, Mr. Hayes allegedly became non-compliant, kicked Correctional

1

All citations to the PSI refer to the 229-page PDF version of the Presentence Report and
its attachments.
1

Officer Rachel Nettles in the shin, and grabbed Correctional Officer Charles Johannessen’s
groin. (See PSI, pp.3, 16.)
The State charged Mr. Hayes by Information with two counts of battery on a correctional
officer, felony, I.C. §§ 18-915(2), 18-901 and 18-903. (R., pp.287-88.) Mr. Hayes entered not
guilty pleas to the charges. (R., p.291.) Mr. Hayes decided to represent himself, with standby
counsel. (See Tr., p.34, L.24 – p.49, L.4.)
The State later filed an Information Part II, alleging Mr. Hayes was a persistent violator
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.652-53.) Mr. Hayes entered a not guilty plea to the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.139, L.15 – p.140, L.3.)
Meanwhile, Mr. Hayes filed a Motion for Defendant to Get a Medical Expert at Public
Expense. (R., pp.329-34.) Mr. Hayes asserted that, on the day of the incident, the correctional
officers assaulted and battered him while he was restrained. (See R., p.330.) He expected a
medical expert to testify that the blood in his urine after the incident was caused by the
correctional officers, who bruised Mr. Hayes’ organs so badly he was bleeding internally for
over thirty-eight days. (See R., pp.330-31.) Mr. Hayes also expected an expert would be able to
testify an ultrasound of his kidneys, ordered by April Dawson, M.D., would show he had no
kidney stones. (See R., p.332.) He asserted all medical tests, through a process of elimination,
showed no diseases or kidney stones caused the blood in his urine. (See R., pp.332-33.)
In a request for subpoenas, Mr. Hayes named Dr. Dawson and a nurse, Kevin Kaae,
among the witnesses that would be called on his behalf. (See R., p.452.) When discussing his
motion to appoint a medical expert at a hearing, Mr. Hayes told the district court Dr. Dawson
ordered medical tests to see why there was so much blood in the urine, and did a scientific
process of elimination to determine a disease did not cause the blood. (See Tr., p.63, L.19 –
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p.64, L.4.) Mr. Hayes asserted, “[t]hrough scientific tests and through reliable medical evidence,
it’s shown that the only reasonable way that all that blood was in the urine was because of
internal injuries that I received from these prison guards and that was, in fact, a very serious and
very violent felony attack upon me.” (Tr., p.64, Ls.5-10.)
The district court asked Mr. Hayes if Dr. Dawson’s testimony would be acceptable
instead of testimony by an independent medical expert, and Mr. Hayes indicated it would be.
(See Tr., p.64, L.11 – p.66, L.10.) The district court then determined it did not find any basis to
appoint an independent medical expert, and if a medical expert had relevant testimony, a
subpoena issued to Dr. Dawson would satisfy what Mr. Hayes was requesting. (Tr., p.66, Ls.1118.) The district court told Mr. Hayes it was reserving the ruling on the motion, because the
court thought he had not satisfied the question of how Dr. Dawson’s testimony would be relevant
to whether Mr. Hayes committed the charged offenses. (See Tr., p.66, L.19 – p.67, L.1.) The
district court then determined it would not issue a subpoena for Mr. Kaae, because his testimony
would be cumulative or duplicative. (See Tr., p.101, L.14 – p.103, L.9.)
The district court gave Mr. Hayes a deadline to file another list of witnesses he wanted
subpoenaed. (See Tr., p.113, L.19 – p.114, L.16.) Mr. Hayes filed a witness list and request for
subpoenas after the district court’s deadline, but he also advised the district court a prison law
library closure had delayed his filings. (See R., pp.610-27.)
In the meantime, the State filed a State’s Motion in Limine, requesting the district court
exclude Mr. Hayes from raising certain questions. (R., pp.534-37.) Among the list of excluded
questions of witnesses, the State included questions related to the prison guidelines on
disciplinary proceedings and infraction hearings. (See R., p.535.) The State asserted those
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categories of questions were not relevant, because failure to follow a policy was not a defense to
battery on a law enforcement officer. (See R., p.546.)
At a subsequent hearing, Mr. Hayes told the district court his medical records went to the
question of innocence, because he never injured the correctional officers at all. (See Tr., p.176,
L.24 – p.177, L.22.) Mr. Hayes explained: “The State’s contention is that I committed a battery
against correctional officers. My contention is that they committed battery against me. And
what it boils down to, Your Honor, is simply a credibility contest.” (Tr., p.178, Ls.17-21.) The
district court did not find the medical records relevant to prove or disprove the question in this
case. (See Tr., p.178, Ls.23-25.)
The district court in a later hearing denied Mr. Hayes’ witness list and other motions for
being untimely. (See Tr., p.194, Ls.2-12, p.196, L.21 – p.197, L.2.) The district court also
addressed the merits of the witness list and request for subpoenas, and determined any evidence
that might be offered by Dr. Dawson or Mr. Kaae would not be relevant to the question of
whether or not Mr. Hayes committed the charged offenses. (See Tr., p.197, L.9 – p.199, L.15.)
Later in that hearing, Mr. Hayes decided he wanted counsel appointed to represent him.
(Tr., p.213, Ls.2-17.) After Mr. Hayes waived his right to a speedy trial, the district court
appointed standby counsel to represent him. (See Tr., p.227, L.22 – p.228, L.9.) The district
court then reset the trial date. (See Tr., p.229, L.2 – p.230, L.14.)
In the meantime, the district court granted the State’s motion in limine with respect to
questions related to the prison guidelines on disciplinary proceedings and infraction hearings.
(See R., p.678.) The district court determined, “Defendant is prohibited from asking questions at
the trial of this matter regarding” those items. (R., p.678.)
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The case proceeded to the jury trial.

(See R., pp.710-26.)

During the jury trial,

Mr. Hayes testified he is “handicapped and disabled,” on account of his “bad back” with “four
ruptured herniated collapsed disks in my lumbar spine.” (Tr., p.514, Ls.1-11.) He testified that
on the day of the incident, he was in his prison cell when Officer Nettles came to the cell door
and told him somebody out in the hall wanted to talk to him. (Tr., p.514, L.22 – p.515, L.13.)
Officer Nettles handcuffed him behind his back before removing him from the cell.

(See

Tr., p.515, L.21 – p.516, L.24.) The officer took him to the cell block foyer. (See Tr., p.517,
Ls.3-4.) Officer Nettles and Officer Michael Montgomery then informed him he was there for
an infraction hearing, because he had pushed the emergency button multiple times in the shower
two days before. (See Tr., p.519, Ls.4-17.)
Officer Montgomery read the infraction report and then allowed him to make a statement.
(See Tr., p.520, L.17 – p.521, L.8.) Mr. Hayes testified he told them no one had given him an
infraction report, and that it did not serve any penological purposes to leave him in the shower
for an extended period of time, when they knew it caused him severe pain because of his bad
back. (See Tr., p.521, L.9 – p.522, L.2.)
Mr. Hayes testified Officer Montgomery became angry. (Tr., p.522, Ls.6-9.) Officer
Montgomery found him guilty and imposed 20 days sanctions. (Tr., p.522, Ls.10-13.) Mr. Hays
testified he told Officer Montgomery, “[w]ell, I’ll just write this up in a civil rights complaint
and I’ll take it downtown and I’ll sue you. You can’t just torture people here. I haven’t done
nothing wrong.” (Tr., p.522, L.21 – p.523, L.1.) Mr. Hayes testified Officer Montgomery then
became verbally abusive and stated, “[p]ut Hayes on the wall now.” (Tr., p.523, Ls.3-8.)
According to Mr. Hayes, Officer Nettles, who had been standing on his left side holding
his arm, “slammed me up against the wall, bounced me off the wall.” (Tr., p.523, Ls.9-13.) He
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testified, “[t]hen Officer Johannessen ran over and grabbed my other arm, my right arm, with one
hand. He grabbed the back of my head and neck with his other hand and he shoved me into the
wall and started grinding my head into the wall . . . . And he was holding me on one side and
Rachel Nettles was holding me on the other side.” (Tr., p.523, L.22 – p.524, L.4.) Mr. Hayes
responded by trying to move his face away from the wall. (See Tr., p.524, Ls.7-18.)
Mr. Hayes testified that Officer Montgomery then yelled, “[p]ut him on the floor,” and
“the three of them body slammed me face first down on the concrete floor . . . .” (Tr., p.524,
Ls.18-25.) He testified, “I didn’t have a reaction. Two people had ahold of me and I was
handcuffed and restrained with my arms and hands behind my back. I wasn’t in control over any
of my body. Two people were jerking me around and throwing me around.” (Tr., p.525, Ls.1321.) Mr. Hayes testified he did not ever make an attempt to kick or grab anybody, and he did not
have a chance to do either of those things. (Tr., p.525, L.22 – p.526, L.3.)
Mr. Hayes testified that, after the officers threw him to the floor, Officer Johannesen
“started grinding my head and neck into the floor and battering me further,” while
Officer Nettles “had pinned me to the floor and she jumped on my left part of my back there with
her knee so she could hold me down on the floor.” (Tr., p.526, Ls.4-21.) Mr. Hayes was unable
to do anything to protect himself.

(See Tr., p.526, Ls.22-25.)

He testified that

Officer Montgomery then “jumped on my back knee first and he repeatedly kneed me in the back
over and over again in my kidneys and the liver area. He kneed me so hard that I was urinating.
I was peeing blood for over 37 days.” (Tr., p.527, Ls.11-17.) The three officers then called
other officers to take control of him. (See Tr., p.527, L.23 – p.528, L.1.)
Later, while Mr. Hayes was in a detention cell, he was medically examined.

(See

Tr., p.530, Ls.14-23.) He testified he had complained to officers and medical staff about injuries
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to his back, shoulders, wrists, and hip area. (See Tr., p.530, L.24 – p.531, L.10.) The officers
brought over a pill call nurse, Gary Rich, who talked to Mr. Hayes through the door. (See
Tr., p.531, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Hayes testified Mr. Rich was not interested in his symptoms and did
not give him pain medication. (See Tr., p.531, L.18 – p.532, L.6.) He testified that afterwards,
he gave a urine sample for a UA test. (See Tr., p.532, L.7 – p.533, L.9.) When he went to the
bathroom, he noticed “the urine had like a color of black streak through it and that’s blood.”
(Tr., p.533, Ls.14-19.)
The State asked Mr. Hayes during cross-examination if he was respectful of correctional
officers and other inmates at all times, and he replied yes. (See Tr., p.535, L.25 – p.536, L.15.)
The State then sought to ask Mr. Hayes about specific instances of his prior conduct showing his
“disrespect” to officers and other inmates. (See Tr., p.537, L.19 – p.544, L.11.) The State
argued the questions on Mr. Hayes’ prior conduct were proper under Idaho Rule of Evidence
608(b). (See Tr., p.546, Ls.13-20.)
Over Mr. Hayes’ objection asserting that Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) was applicable
and the defense had not opened the door to the inquiry (see Tr., p.544, Ls.13-24), the district
court determined the prior conduct was relevant to Mr. Hayes’ credibility (see Tr., p.549, Ls.2122). The district court also determined it was not unduly prejudicial. (See Tr., p.550, Ls.1-5.)
The State then questioned Mr. Hayes about eight prior instances where he had allegedly been
disrespectful to correctional officers or other inmates. (See Tr., p.553, L.12 – p.558, L.19.)
On direct examination, Mr. Hayes testified he did not initiate any aggressive action
towards the officers during the incident, nor did he ever attempt to hit, kick, or grab anybody.
(See Tr., p.534, Ls.1-10.) However, Officer Nettles testified that after Officer Montgomery
found Mr. Hayes guilty, Mr. Hayes became angry and yelled about taking the matter downtown,
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and she ordered Mr. Hayes to get against the wall so he could not spit on Officer Montgomery.
(See Tr., p.418, L.9 – p.419, L.9.) Officer Nettles and Officer Johannessen testified Mr. Hayes
became more and more aggressive and threatened to kill them. (See Tr., p.420, L.9 – p.421, L.3,
p.450, Ls.18-24.)
Officer Nettles testified Mr. Hayes used his legs as leverage as he tried to move from
where he was on the wall, and his left foot hit her right shin at least once. (See Tr., p.421, L.16 –
p.422, L.7.) On cross-examination, she testified that the physical touching that occurred between
her and Mr. Hayes could have been partly accidental.

(Tr., p.435, Ls.2-5.)

On redirect

examination, Officer Nettles testified that Mr. Hayes intentionally kicked her some of the times
he made contact. (Tr., p.436, L.25 – p.437, L.2.) On direct examination, she testified she did not
need medical attention. (Tr., p.423, Ls.8-9.)
Officer Johannessen testified that he saw Officer Nettles trying to hold Mr. Hayes against
the wall, and he moved in and took hold of Mr. Hayes’ left arm. (See Tr., p.449, Ls.16-23.) He
testified Mr. Hayes was pushing off the wall and pushing back against them, and Mr. Hayes
made contact with and slightly squeezed his groin. (See Tr., p.451, L.8 – p.452, L.11.) Officer
Johannessen did not see how the contact would have been accidental. (See Tr., p.452, Ls.13-15.)
Officer Nettles testified she saw Mr. Hayes grab Officer Johannessen’s private area. (See
Tr., p.423, Ls.12-18.)

Officer Johnannessen testified he believed Mr. Hayes struck

Officer Nettles, but he did not see it actually happen with Mr. Hayes’ feet. (See Tr., p.452,
Ls.19-23.) Officer Montgomery testified he saw Mr. Hayes kick Officer Nettles, and he believed
Mr. Hayes grabbed Officer Johannessen. (See Tr., p.486, Ls.13-24.)
The officers testified Officer Montgomery struck Mr. Hayes in the shoulder area,
Mr. Hayes and the officers ended up on the ground, and a response team then came in. (See
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Tr., p.424, L.9 – p.425, L.20, p.453, L.9 – p.454, L.4, p.487, L.25 – p.488, L.16.) Officer
Montgomery, in response to a question by the district court on whether he was aware of any
video cameras that would have recorded the incident, testified, “[t]here are no video cameras in
the lower foyer.” (Tr., p.497, Ls.7-11.)
Mr. Rich, a prison licensed practical nurse during the incident, testified he assessed
Mr. Hayes after the incident. (See Tr., p.466, L.6 – p.467, L.16.) He testified Mr. Hayes was
complaining about his wrists and pain in his back. (Tr., p.468, Ls.16-18.) Mr. Rich testified
that, when he looked at Mr. Hayes’ back, he did not see any redness or bruising. (Tr., p.468,
L.23 – p.469, L.8.) He testified he did not palpate the area. (See Tr., p.470, Ls.6-11.) However,
Mr. Rich’s report of the assessment stated that when he palpated it, Mr. Hayes did not flinch.
(See Tr., p.472, Ls.19-22; State’s Ex. 10.) Based on the State’s exhibits, Mr. Rich testified
Mr. Hayes had slight lacerations to his wrist, consistent with being scraped by handcuffs. (See
Tr., p.472, L.23 – p.473, L.11; State’s Exs. 7 & 8.)
Mr. Rich testified that later, Mr. Hayes continued to complain about his back hurting, and
complained about blood in his urine. (See Tr., p.473, L.16 – p.474, L.6.) He testified Mr. Hayes
did not turn in a request for a health assessment as required to get a urine sample. (Tr., p.474,
Ls.10-12.) Also, Mr. Rich testified they were not able to find any blood in Mr. Hayes’ cell or in
the toilet. (Tr., p.474, Ls.13-14.) On cross-examination, Mr. Rich testified he did not conduct
any urine tests, did not remember hearing of any urine tests being done, and did not know if
Mr. Hayes had later tested positive for blood in his urine. (See Tr., p.478, Ls.7-17.)
The jury found Mr. Hayes guilty of battery on a correctional officer against
Officer Nettles, and not guilty of battery on a correctional officer against Officer Johannessen.
(Tr., p.610, Ls.1-8.) Mr. Hayes announced that he was firing his trial counsel, proceeding pro se,
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and moving for a mistrial, but the district court removed him from the courtroom.

(See

Tr., p.610, Ls.10-22.) In light of the conviction, the State moved to dismiss the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (See Tr., p.608, L.23 – p.609, L.8.)
The district court subsequently granted Mr. Hayes’ motion to proceed pro se. (See
Tr., p.619, L.14 – p.621, L.11.) Still later, the district court granted Mr. Hayes’ motion to
appoint conflict counsel. (See R., pp.1083-86; Tr., p.625, Ls.6-10.) He received conflict counsel
after filing a tort claim against his trial counsel’s office. (See Tr., p.628, Ls.1-23.)
Through conflict counsel, Mr. Hayes filed a Motion for New Trial. (R., pp.1108-09.)
Among the grounds for a new trial, Mr. Hayes asserted a new trial should be ordered under
I.C. § 19-2406(5) because the district court erred when it granted the State’s motion in limine
prohibiting Mr. Hayes from asking questions related to the prison guidelines. (See R., p.1123.)
Mr. Hayes asserted the prison guidelines were relevant to whether the correctional officers had a
motive to lie about their behavior during the incident being in compliance with the guidelines.
The district court subsequently denied the motion for a new trial. (R., pp.1263-78.) With
respect to the district court preventing Mr. Hayes from impeaching the State’s witnesses with the
prison’s discipline and force policies, the district court determined the questions were irrelevant,
and even if they were relevant, they were inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403
(“Rule 403”). (See R., pp.1274-75.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of two and one-half years fixed, to be
served consecutively to all other sentences being served. (R., pp.1239-42; Tr., p.689, Ls.15-17.)
Mr. Hayes, through conflict counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district
court’s Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.1285-89.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it declined to issue subpoenas directing April Dawson,
M.D., and Kevin Kaae to testify on Mr. Hayes’ behalf?

II.

Did the district court err when it allowed the State, on cross-examination of Mr. Hayes, to
inquire into specific instances of his prior conduct towards correctional officers and
other inmates?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hayes’ motion for a new
trial, on the basis the district court erred as a matter of law when it prohibited Mr. Hayes
from asking the correctional officers questions related to the prison guidelines?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Declined To Issue Subpoenas Directing April Dawson, M.D.
And Kevin Kaae To Testify On Mr. Hayes’ Behalf

A.

Introduction And Relevant Facts
Mr. Hayes asserts the district court erred when it declined to issue subpoenas directing

April Dawson, M.D., and Kevin Kaae to testify on Mr. Hayes’ behalf. Dr. Dawson’s and
Mr. Kaae’s proposed testimony about Mr. Hayes’ medical condition and medical records was
relevant to Mr. Hayes’ defense.
In his motion for a medical expert (see R., pp.329-34), Mr. Hayes asserted he expected an
expert to be able to testify that “[a]ll the blood that was in the urine of victim Michael T. Hayes
after 11/10/2015 was caused by the 3 prison guards who on 11/10/2015 caused great [bodily]
harm to victim Michael T. Hayes and [bruised] his internal organs so bad that victim Hayes was
bleeding internally for over 38 days.” (R., pp.330-31.) An expert would be able to testify, “[t]he
ultrasound that was done of victim Hayes’s kidneys showed that there was no kidney stones in
[either] kidney right or [left].” (R., p.332.) “The ultrasound was done on 1/5/2016 at the Idaho
State Correctional Center (ISCC),” and it was “ordered on 12/9/2015 by Doctor April Dawson
M.D. at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI).” (R., p.332.) Further, “[a]ll medical
tests done through a process of elimination showed no diseases and no kidney stones caused the
blood to be in Michael T. Hayes’s urine.” (R., pp.332-33.)
In a request for subpoenas, Mr. Hayes named Dr. Dawson and Kevin Kaae among the
witnesses that would be called on his behalf. (See R., p.452.) When discussing his motion to
appoint a medical expert at a hearing, Mr. Hayes told the district court, “[t]here were 16 x-rays of
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my body taken after this altercation where I was severely beaten up by these prison guards while
I was handcuffed and in restraints. There was also Dr. April Dawson, the M.D., ordered other
medical tests to see why there was so much blood in the urine and she did a scientific process of
elimination to determine whether a disease caused all that blood to be in the urine and it did not.”
(Tr., p.63, L.19 – p.64, L.4.)
Mr. Hayes asserted, “[t]hrough scientific tests and through reliable medical evidence, it’s
shown that the only reasonable way that all that blood was in the urine was because of internal
injuries that I received from these prison guards and that was, in fact, a very serious and very
violent felony attack upon me.” (Tr., p.64, Ls.5-10.) According to Mr. Hayes, Dr. Dawson
determined “all this blood that was in the urine for over 37 days after this altercation was caused
by internal bleeding from the injuries that were inflicted upon me by the three prison guards.”
(Tr., p.65, Ls.4-8.)
The district court stated, “[t]he only question I’m trying to address at this point is why we
need to appoint a separate or independent expert who wasn’t one of the treating professionals in
this particular case.” (Tr., p.65, Ls.13-16.) The district court thought Mr. Hayes was “really just
seeking essentially that the State would subpoena, and to the extent costs are incurred, to cover
the costs of—and I guess what you are saying here today of Dr. Dawson to come in and testify as
to these facts.” (Tr., p.66, Ls.3-5.) When asked if that was a fair statement of his motion,
Mr. Hayes replied, “[t]hat could be interpreted as a fair statement, yes.” (Tr., p.66, Ls.8-10.)
The district court then determined it did not find any basis to appoint an independent
medical expert, and if a medical expert had relevant testimony, a subpoena issued to Dr. Dawson
would satisfy Mr. Hayes’ request. (Tr., p.66, Ls.11-18.) The district court told Mr. Hayes, “I’m
reserving the ruling on this motion right now because I still think we haven’t exactly satisfied the
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question of whether or not what Dr. Dawson might have to testify about regarding your
subsequent medical care and treatment is, in fact, relevant to the question of whether or not you
committed the crime charged.” (Tr., p.66, L.19 – p.67, L.1.)
When the district court went over Mr. Hayes’ list of subpoenas, Mr. Hayes explained
Mr. Kaae “was the one who was collecting the UA samples from me and he told the guards
outside my door at one point that—and the reason I remember this is because he had collected a
UA sample and he says: There’s sure a lot of blood in these urine samples.” (Tr., p.101, L.14 –
p.102, L.7.) The district court asked if Mr. Kaae would “provide any testimony that’s going to
be anything but cumulative to what Dr. Dawson could testify about,” and Mr. Hayes answered
that he “can physically testify that there was so much blood in the urine that it was very visible
by the naked eye. Also—”. (Tr., p.102, Ls.19-24.)
The district court then cut off Mr. Hayes, stating, “[w]e’ve got tests that can testify to
that.” (Tr., p.102, L.25 – p.103, L.1.) The district court told him, “I’m not going to allow
cumulative or unnecessary evidence. We’re going to have a trial; we’ll give you a fair trial, but
there’s no reason to have cumulative or duplicative evidence. The doctor—if this evidence is
even relevant—could testify as to that.” (Tr., p.103, Ls.2-8.) The district court determined, “I’m
not going to give you a subpoena for Nurse Kevin here.” (Tr., p.103, Ls.8-9.)
Still later in the hearing, the district court told Mr. Hayes, “I think what I’m going to do
on this witness list and request for subpoenas is essentially require that before November 22nd,
you prepare for me a list of witnesses that you want subpoenaed . . . .” (Tr., p.113, Ls.19-23.)
The district court directed Mr. Hayes to “have it filed by November 22nd and we’ll decide on
December 2nd whether and to what extent we’ll issue those subpoenas.” (Tr., p.114, Ls.14-16.)
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The district court later indicated it was having trouble finding that Mr. Hayes’ medical
records would be relevant. (See Tr., p.116, Ls.3-21) The district court did not “see it proves
anything, but I haven’t made that final decision.” (Tr., p.117, Ls.3-4.) The district court told
Mr. Hayes, “you got an uphill climb to convince me that it’s relevant to anything and that issuing
a subpoena for Dr. Dawson is going to produce any relevant evidence or testimony. Simple as
that.” (Tr., p.117, Ls.5-9.)
At a later hearing, Mr. Hayes told the district court the prison would not give him his
medical records. (Tr., p.176, L.24 – p.177, L.8.) The district court asked him, “[h]ow are your
medical records going to prove or disprove whether or not you battered these correctional
officers.”

(Tr., p.177, Ls.12-14.)

Mr. Hayes answered, “[i]t goes to the evidence of

innocence . . . . Because I never injured them at all.” (Tr., p.177, Ls.15-22.)

Mr. Hayes

explained: “The State’s contention is that I committed a battery against correctional officers.
My contention is that they committed battery against me. And what it boils down to, Your
Honor, is simply a credibility contest.” (Tr., p.178, Ls.17-21.) The district court then stated,
“[w]ell, I’m not finding [these] medical records relevant to prove or disprove the question in this
case.” (Tr., p.178, Ls.23-25.)
During the next pretrial conference (see Tr., p.192, Ls.1-22), the district court determined
Mr. Hayes’ witness list and other motions were “untimely as previously indicated,” and denied
them for untimeliness (see Tr., p.194, Ls.2-12, p.196, L.21 – p.197, L.2). The district court
nevertheless addressed the merits of the witness list and request for subpoenas, observing,
Mr. Hayes “indicates Dr. April Dawson and nurse Kevin Kaae . . . as providers regarding the
medical care he received at the prison basically to support the assertion that he suffered some
injury that resulted in blood in his urine as a consequence of this case.” (Tr., p.197, Ls.9-13.)
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The district court did not “find that any evidence that might be offered by Dr. April
Dawson or Kevin Kaae is relevant to the question of whether or not the defendant committed this
crime. Therefore, they would not be allowed under any circumstance.” (Tr., p.199, Ls.10-15.)
But Dr. Dawson’s and Mr. Kaae’s proposed testimony about Mr. Hayes’ medical condition and
medical records was actually relevant to Mr. Hayes’ defense.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
At the time the district court declined to issue the subpoenas, Idaho Criminal Rule 17

provided, “[a] subpoena shall be issued by the clerk of the court or the judge thereof or as
otherwise allowed by statute, and shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend
and give testimony at the time and place specified therein. The clerk may issue a subpoena,
signed and sealed, but otherwise in blank to a party requesting it who must fill in the blanks
before it is served.” I.C.R. 17(a) (2016).2
However, a defendant has no right to present irrelevant evidence, and even if evidence is
relevant, it may be excluded in certain cases. State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 452 (2016). The
Idaho Rules of Evidence at the time of the district court’s decision explained that “[a]ll relevant
evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in
the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” I.R.E. 402 (2016).
Evidence was relevant if it was “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401 (2016). “Facts of consequence are facts bearing on
the elements of the crimes charged.” State v. Boman, 123 Idaho 947, 950 (Ct. App. 1993). An
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appellate court reviews the question of relevancy de novo. State v. Radebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,
765 (1993).

C.

Dr. Dawson’s And Mr. Kaae’s Proposed Testimony Was Relevant To Mr. Hayes’
Defense
Dr. Dawson’s and Mr. Kaae’s proposed testimony about Mr. Hayes’ medical condition

and medical records was relevant to Mr. Hayes’ defense. Mr. Hayes’ defense was that he did not
commit a battery on the officers, but rather the officers committed a battery on him. (See, e.g.,
Tr., p.178, Ls.17-21.) The fact that Mr. Hayes had blood in his urine, and Dr. Dawson’s medical
tests ruled out disease or kidney stones as a cause of the blood in the urine (see R., pp.332-33;
Tr., p.63, L.19 – p.64, L.4), was relevant to support this defense. Specifically, evidence of blood
in Mr. Hayes’ urine, and ruling out a disease or kidney stones as the cause of the blood in the
urine, supported Mr. Hayes’ assertion that he had the injuries because the officers committed a
battery on him. See I.R.E. 401. Further, the fact that Mr. Kaae saw that the blood in Mr. Hayes’
urine was visible to the naked eye was relevant to support Mr. Hayes’ defense. A logical
inference from the amount of blood was that Mr. Hayes’ injuries were serious enough that a
likely cause was the officers committing a battery on him as he described. See I.R.E. 401.
Because their proposed testimony on Mr. Hayes’ medical condition and medical records
supported Mr. Hayes’ defense that the officers committed a battery on him, the evidence was
relevant under Rule 401. Thus, the district court erred when it declined to issue subpoenas
directing Dr. Dawson and Mr. Kaae to testify on Mr. Hayes’ behalf, after determining their
testimony was not relevant. See I.C.R. 17(a).

2

Rule 17(a) currently provides: “[a] subpoena must be issued by the clerk of the court or the
judge, and must command each person to whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at the
time and place specified in it.” I.C.R. 17(a) (2017).
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D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Was Harmless
Mr. Hayes asserts the State will be unable to prove that the district court’s error in

declining to issue the subpoenas for Dr. Dawson and Mr. Kaae was harmless. Where alleged
error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows that a violation
occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, based on the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To hold an error
as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was
no reasonably possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Mr. Rich, one of the State’s witnesses, was the only trial witness trained as a medical
provider. (See Tr., p.5 (list of trial witnesses).) Mr. Rich testified he did not see any redness or
bruising when he looked at Mr. Hayes’ back after the incident, and his report stated Mr. Hayes
did not flinch when Mr. Rich palpated his back. (See Tr., p.468, L.23 – p.469, L.8, p.472, Ls.1922.) Mr. Rich testified on cross-examination that he did not conduct any urine tests, did not
remember hearing of any urine tests being done, and did not know whether Mr. Hayes had later
tested positive for blood in his urine. (See Tr., p.478, Ls.7-17.)
In closing arguments, the State used Mr. Rich’s testimony to downplay the extent of
Mr. Hayes injuries. The State contended Mr. Hayes’ “testimony is not corroborated. Again, he
is telling you that his face is mashed into a wall and his—they kneed him in the back and put all
their weight on him; all three officers. There is no evidence of that.” (Tr., p.588, Ls.22-25.)
The State argued, “Gary Rich, who again doesn’t have any interest in this case, who doesn’t even
work there anymore, testified that he was there within several minutes and he’s palpating his
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back. . . .

He palpates his back and he doesn’t wince.

There’s absolutely no redness.”

(Tr., p.589, Ls.1-8.)
Testimony from Dr. Dawson and Mr. Kaae on how urine tests had actually been
conducted after the incident, that Mr. Hayes had blood in his urine, and that the blood in the
urine was not caused by a disease or kidney stones, would have undermined the State’s argument
that the extent of Mr. Hayes’ injuries, as documented by Mr. Rich, did not corroborate
Mr. Hayes’ testimony that the officers committed a battery on him. Thus, the State will be
unable to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court’s error in declining to
issue subpoenas directing Dr. Dawson and Mr. Kaae to testify on Mr. Hayes’ behalf
was harmless. Mr. Hayes’ judgment of conviction should be vacated, and his case should be
remanded for further proceedings.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The State, On Cross-Examination, To Inquire Into
Specific Instances Of Mr. Hayes’ Prior Conduct Towards Correctional Officers And
Other Inmates

A.

Introduction And Relevant Facts
Mr. Hayes asserts the district court erred when it allowed the State, on cross-examination

of Mr. Hayes, to inquire into specific instances of his prior conduct towards correctional officers
and other inmates. The prior conduct is not relevant to Mr. Hayes’ character for untruthfulness,
the purported reason offered by the State for allowing the inquiries. Even if the prior conduct
were relevant to Mr. Hayes’ character for untruthfulness, the district court abused its discretion
under Rule 403 when it allowed the inquiry, because the prior conduct’s danger of undue
prejudice substantially outweighs any minimal probative value it might have.
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During the trial, the State asked Mr. Hayes in cross-examination, “[y]ou are then telling
this jury that you’re respectful of other inmates all the time at the correctional institute? You’re
always respectful of other inmates?” (Tr., p.535, L.25 – p.536, L.3.) Mr. Hayes replied, “[o]ther
inmates? Yes.” (Tr., p.536, L.4.) The State asked him, “[a]ll the time?”, and he answered, “[a]ll
the time.” (Tr., p.536, Ls.5-6.) The State then asked, “[a]nd you’re also telling this jury that you
are respectful of the guards all the time out at the institute?” (Tr., p.536, Ls.7-9.) Mr. Hayes
responded, “[y]es. Cripples like me can’t defend their selves against these guards because they
always got you in handcuffs anyway. You have to be respectful.” (Tr., p.536, Ls.10-12.) His
testimony was that he was respectful of the guards at all times. (See Tr., p.536, Ls.13-15.)
When the State asked him if he was telling the jury that he was the victim in this case, Mr. Hayes
stated, “[y]es, that’s correct. I am the victim.” (Tr., p.536, Ls.18-19.)
Outside the presence of the jury, the State then made an offer of proof of ten separate
instances regarding Mr. Hayes’ “disrespect to inmates over the time period, which would be in
direct contradiction to his under-oath testimony that he’s respectful of other inmates and guards
at all times.” (See Tr., p.537, L.19 – p.544, L.11.) In response, Mr. Hayes asserted, “I think it’s
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 as well as 404(B), prior bad acts of misconduct can only be used if
the opposing party has first opened the door to evidence or acts of good character, and on direct
examination we never went into that. We never said this guy was a saint. We never put on any
evidence that he’s a good character.” (Tr., p.544, Ls.15-21.) Mr. Hayes asserted the State “did
this by opening that door on cross examination.” (Tr., p.544, Ls.22-23.) He also asserted, “[t]o
allow all of these incidents of prior bad acts would be extremely prejudicial and far outweigh the
risk of probative value. It turns this trial into a character assassination rather than an episode of
the battery being committed on law enforcement officers.” (Tr., p.544, L.25 – p.545, L.4.)
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The State replied that the district court “can give a curative instruction directing the jurors
that they may only consider this as to the defendant’s credibility.” (Tr., p.545, Ls.10-13.) The
State argued it was not offering the prior instances “to show his intent” or “for a 404(b)
purpose,” but “to avoid a fraud on the court where the defendant gets to sit up there and make it
look like he’s this angel that did absolutely nothing to provoke because he’s such a respectful
inmate and he’s handicapped and he—you know, he never threatens people and he’s respectful at
all times.” (Tr., p.545, Ls.14-21.) The State contended it was “merely asking the court to let the
jury decide who’s telling the truth here. Are the guards telling the truth? Or is this defendant
telling the truth?” (Tr., p.546, Ls.2-5.)
When the district court asked the State what rule was applicable, the State replied, “I
think 608(B) is the rule.” (Tr., p.546, Ls.13-20.) The district court told Mr. Hayes, “I don’t see
this as a 404(B) question.” (Tr., p.547, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Hayes asserted, “these incidences that [the
State] has just outlined for you are all prior bad acts,” but the district court determined, “the rule
at issue is the question of attacking his credibility. That’s a 608 question.” (Tr., p.547, Ls.1-9.)
The district court stated, “[c]learly any of this evidence being offered by the State in their case in
chief, I think, would have been excluded under 404(B) and 404(A)(1) if it had come up in that
context.

But I think it really falls under 404(A)(3), which then kicks us over into 608.”

(Tr., p.548, Ls.8-14.)
The district court determined, “I think that the evidence is relevant to the question of
credibility.” (Tr., p.549, Ls.21-22.) The district court thought “the State might simply ask as to
whether or not the defendant acknowledges that actions were taken against him related to this
incident or that incident and such as that.

I don’t think that that is unduly prejudicial.”
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(Tr., p.550, Ls.1-5.) The district court determined, “I think it’s probative to the question of
whether or not the defendant was truthful on the witness stand.” (Tr., p.550, Ls.6-8.)
Mr. Hayes reiterated that “our position remains the same; that is, that I don’t think it’s
proper to allow this sort of impeachment evidence unless the defense first opened the door to it.”
(Tr., p.550, Ls.21-24.) The district court stated, “I think credibility is always an issue. I’m sorry
to interrupt. I do think credibility is always an issue as well as bias.” (Tr., p.550, L.25 – p.551,
L.2.) The district court decided to allow the State to inquire as to each instance, and Mr. Hayes
would be able to admit or deny it, without the State being able to admit extrinsic evidence such
as DORs or reports. (See Tr., p.552, Ls.2-25.)
The State then questioned Mr. Hayes about eight instances where he had allegedly been
disrespectful to guards or other inmates.3 (See Tr., p.553, L.12 – p.558, L.19.) At the end of the
inquiries, Mr. Hayes stated, “[a] lot of what you said are just made up stories,” and “[n]one of it
is true.” (Tr., p.558, Ls.14-19.) He testified he “might have been a little upset” at the infraction
hearing, but he was not angry. (See Tr., p.559, Ls.7-14.) Mr. Hayes also had a criminal
conviction, but he testified that the conviction was illegal. (See Tr., p.560, L.5 – p.561, L.9.)
As part of the final jury instructions, the district court instructed the jury, “evidence
solicited from the defendant on cross examination was admitted for a limited purpose related to
the defendant’s credibility. That evidence should not be considered by you for any purpose other
than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.” (Tr., p.581, Ls.19-23; see R., p.765.)

3

Specifically, the eight instances involved Mr. Hayes allegedly: (1) telling an officer he was
going to knock her through a wall; (2) insulting an officer when he would not bring him his legal
paperwork; (3) insulting and threatening an officer; (4) insulting an officer and stating he was
going to write the officer up; (5) insulting an officer about a food tray; (6) insulting an officer
and daring the officer to give him DORs; (7) yelling a racial slur at another inmate; and
(8) insulting an officer while refusing to do a urinalysis. (See Tr., p.553, L.12 – p.558, L.19.)
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B.

Standard Of Review
As discussed above, questions of relevancy are reviewed de novo. Radebaugh, 124 Idaho

at 764 (1993). An appellate court reviews a district court’s conclusion that the probative value of
evidence is not outweighed by its unfair prejudice for an abuse of discretion. State v. Tapia, 127
Idaho 249, 254 (1995). When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is: (1) whether the district court
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the
outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

C.

The Prior Conduct Is Not Relevant To Mr. Hayes’ Character For Untruthfulness
The district court erred when it allowed the inquiry into the specific instances of

Mr. Hayes’ prior conduct.

The prior conduct is not relevant to Mr. Hayes’ character for

untruthfulness pursuant to Rule 608(b), the purported reason offered by the State for the inquiry.
The State inquired into eight instances where Mr. Hayes had allegedly been disrespectful
towards correctional officers or other inmates. (See Tr., p.553, L.12 – p.558, L.19.) However,
those instances do not indicate anything about Mr. Hayes’ character for untruthfulness. Rather,
the prior conduct contradicts Mr. Hayes’ testimony, elicited earlier during cross-examination,
that he was always respectful to other inmates and to guards.
At the time of trial, Idaho Rule of Evidence 608 provided: “The credibility of a witness
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations . . .

the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness . . . .” I.R.E. 608(a)(1) (2017). “Specific instance of the conduct of a witness, for
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the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness concerning . . . the character of the witness for truthfulness or
untruthfulness . . . .” I.R.E. 608(b)(1) (2017).
In his special concurrence in State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30 (Ct. App. 1988), Judge Burnett
examined the scope of Rule 608(b): “It says that impeachment to show character for
untruthfulness is limited to an inquiry upon cross-examination. The impeaching party may not
introduce extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts for this purpose.” Guinn, 114 Idaho at 40 (Burnett,
J., specially concurring). “However, the rule is silent regarding impeachment by specific acts to
challenge credibility on other grounds. The rule says nothing, for example, about impeachment
to show bias or improper motive for testifying. Commentators on the federal rule have treated
this silence as pregnant—that is, as an indication that extrinsic evidence can be used to show bias
or improper motive on the part of a witness.” Id. As Judge Burnett put it, “[t]he distinction,
simply restated, is between a propensity to lie and a reason to lie. The witness with a character
for untruthfulness has a propensity to lie; the witness with a bias or improper motive has a reason
to lie.” Id.4
Similarly, Rule 608(b) says nothing on impeachment by contradiction.

Before the

adoption of Rule 608(b), the Idaho Supreme Court stated, “impeachment by contradiction may
be accomplished either by eliciting a contradictory fact on cross-examination or by calling other

4

Judge Burnett stated Rule 608(b)’s limitation on extrinsic evidence to show a propensity to lie
revealed a hidden hypothesis that a reason to lie was more dangerous to the truth-seeking process
than a propensity to lie. See Guinn, 114 Idaho at 40 (Burnett, J., specially concurring). He wrote
the hypothesis was based on conventional wisdom, but the conventional wisdom broke down
when a propensity to lie actually manifested in the courtroom. See id.
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witnesses in rebuttal.” Gem-Valley Ranches, Inc., v. Small, 90 Idaho 354, 371 (1966). In
discussing Rule 608(b)’s federal counterpart, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted that “impeachment by contradiction is not governed by [Rule 608(b)].” United
States v. Castillo, 181 F.3d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit in Castillo held,
“[i]mpeachment by contradiction is properly considered under Rule 607, not Rule 608(b).” Id. at
1133. Much like its federal analogue, see id., Idaho Rule of Evidence 607 provides, “[a]ny party,
including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.” I.R.E. 607.
The eight instances the State inquired into while cross-examining Mr. Hayes are not
relevant to his character for untruthfulness.

The instances involved Mr. Hayes allegedly

insulting correctional officers with vulgar language, threatening officers, and yelling a racial slur
at another inmate. (See Tr., p.553, L.12 – p.558, L.19.) However, none of those instances
involved Mr. Hayes lying or otherwise engaging in dishonest behavior. Thus, they have no
probative value as to Mr. Hayes’ propensity to lie. The eight instances of prior conduct are not
relevant to Mr. Hayes’ character for untruthfulness.
Because the eight instances are not relevant to Mr. Hayes’ character for untruthfulness,
they are not admissible under Rule 608(b), the reason offered by the State for allowing inquiry
into the prior conduct. Thus, the district court erred when it allowed the State to inquire into the
specific instances of Mr. Hayes’ prior conduct towards correctional officers and other inmates.

D.

The Prior Conduct’s Danger Of Unfair Prejudice Substantially Outweighs Its Minimal
Probative Value
Even if the prior conduct were relevant to Mr. Hayes’ character for untruthfulness, its

danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs any minimal probative value it might have.
Thus, the district court abused its discretion, under Rule 403, by allowing the State to inquire
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into the specific instances of Mr. Hayes’ prior conduct. The district court did not act consistently
with the applicable legal standards.
At the time of trial, Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provided: “Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” I.R.E. 403 (2017).
The prior conduct’s danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its minimal
probative value. As discussed above, none of the eight instances of prior conduct the State
inquired into involved Mr. Hayes lying or engaging in dishonest behavior. (See Tr., p.553, L.12
– p.558, L.19.)

However, the instances, by and large, saw Mr. Hayes allegedly use vulgar

language, mainly directed towards correctional officers. (See generally Tr., pp.553-58.) Two of
the instances described by the State involved Mr. Hayes threatening correctional officers, such as
when Mr. Hayes allegedly told an officer he was “going to knock her through a wall,” (see
Tr., p.553, Ls.17-19), or when he allegedly told another officer, “[y]ou had better get out of here
before something big comes to you” (see Tr., p.556, Ls.3-6). In another instance, Mr. Hayes
allegedly called another inmate a racial slur multiple times. (See Tr., p.556, L.25 – p.557, L.3.)
In sum, the instances of prior conduct portrayed Mr. Hayes in a very unfavorable light,
showing a personality and behavior that would be inherently unlikable to a jury. The profanity
allegedly directed towards correctional officers was inflammatory, not to mention the racial slur
allegedly used against another inmate. Additionally, two of the instances involved Mr. Hayes
allegedly going beyond insults and making open or veiled threats to officers. Thus, while the
probative value of the prior conduct as to Mr. Hayes’ character for untruthfulness was minimal at
best, the nature of the prior conduct created a great risk that the jury would consider the conduct
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as evidence that Mr. Hayes was a bad person and thereby more likely to have committed the
charged offenses, not that he had a character for untruthfulness. In sum, as Mr. Hayes asserted
before the district court, allowing the prior conduct was extremely prejudicial and far outweighed
any probative value, turning the trial into a “character assassination” of Mr. Hayes.

(See

Tr., p.544, L.25 – p.545, L.4.)
The district court therefore abused its discretion under Rule 403 when it allowed the State
to inquire on cross-examination into the specific instances of Mr. Hayes’ prior conduct towards
correctional officers and other inmates, because the prior conduct’s danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs any minimal probative value. The district court did not act consistently
with the applicable legal standards.

E.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Was Harmless
Because the district court’s erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the

State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As explored
above, where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows
that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
The State will be unable to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the district
court’s error in allowing the State to inquire into specific instances of Mr. Hayes’ prior conduct
towards correctional officers and other inmates is harmless. The inquiries into prior conduct
contributed to the conviction, even in the face of the district court’s jury instruction purportedly
limiting the jury’s use of the inquiry into prior conduct.
Appellate courts “presume that the jury followed the jury instructions given by the trial
court in reaching its verdict.” State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718 (2011). The district court
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instructed the jury, “evidence solicited from the defendant on cross examination was admitted for
a limited purpose related to the defendant’s credibility. That evidence should not be considered
by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which is was admitted.” (Tr., p.581,
Ls.19-23.) However, as shown above, the specific instances of prior conduct had no relevance
(or, at best, minimal relevance) to Mr. Hayes’ character for untruthfulness, the reason the State
offered the instances. Based on the prior conduct’s lack of relevance for its ostensible purpose, it
is possible the jury disregarded the jury instruction and instead considered the specific instances
for issues other than credibility. 5
Moreover, the State’s contentions during closing arguments compounded the error. The
State argued, “[a]nd how about [Mr. Hayes’] ability to exaggerate? He claims he’s never ever
been disrespectful to any guards or inmates. Really?” (Tr., p.589, Ls.11-13.) The State also
highlighted Mr. Hayes’ behavior during the inquiries, contending, “[y]ou also get to determine
and consider his demeanor on the witness stand and when the judge had to basically take hold
and direct him. I mean, that kind of speaks for itself.” (See Tr., p.589, Ls.11-16.) This focus on
the inquiries into Mr. Hayes’ prior conduct further increased the prejudicial effect of allowing
the State to so inquire. Thus, the State cannot prove the error was harmless. Mr. Hayes’
judgment of conviction should be vacated, and his case should be remanded for
further proceedings.

5

Mr. Hayes does not raise the district court’s giving the jury instruction as a separate issue,
because there was no specific objection to that jury instruction made before the district court.
However, he asserts the jury instruction may still be considered in evaluating the harm caused by
the erroneous decision to allow the State’s inquiries into his prior conduct.
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III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hayes’ Motion For A New Trial,
On The Basis The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law When It Prohibited Mr. Hayes From
Asking The Correctional Officers Questions Related To The Prison Guidelines

A.

Introduction And Relevant Facts
Mr. Hayes asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a

new trial, on the basis the district court erred as a matter of law when it prohibited Mr. Hayes
from asking the correctional officers questions related to the prison guidelines for disciplinary
proceedings and infraction hearings. The questions related to the prison guidelines were actually
relevant to whether the officers had a motive to lie because their behavior during the incident
was in violation of the guidelines. Furthermore, the questions were not inadmissible under
Rule 403 for being a waste of time, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
Among the grounds for a new trial, Mr. Hayes asserted a new trial should be ordered
under I.C. § 19-2406(5) because the district court erred in its evidentiary rulings.

(See

R., pp.1122-26.) One such evidentiary ruling was when the district court granted the State’s
motion in limine, “disallowing the Defendant from asking questions related to prison procedure
for disciplinary hearings, [and] whether the complaining witnesses had been trained by the prison
system to conduct an infraction hearing.” (R., p.1123.) Mr. Hayes asserted the district court’s
order granting the motion in limine “prevented the Defendant from properly impeaching the
complaining witnesses regarding their behavior during the incident in violation of the prison’s
discipline and use of force policies.” (R., p.1123.)
Mr. Hayes asserted, “[t]he relevant policies and procedures include, for example, a
memorandum dated [May, 6, 1997] from the prison warden that required the prison ‘to allow
inmates to express themselves in their concerns and grievances even to the extent of 1) Hostile
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verbage [sic] (2) Sexual verb[i]age 3) Threatening verb[i]age . . . . We will all need to be more
tolerant when an inmate expresses himself in these written or verbal forms of communication.’”
(R., p.1123 (some alterations in original); see R., p.1128.) He asserted additional relevant
policies, “which would have demonstrated that the complaining witnesses acted in violation of
established prison policies in how the[y] engaged with the defendant on the date of the incident,”
were disallowed to be used as impeachment evidence. (R., pp.1123-24; see R., pp.1129-94.)
Mr. Hayes asserted, “[t]his information was particularly relevant in the defendant’s case,
as the defendant had argued that he was the victim of the prison’s battery against him. In other
words, he sought to argue that the prison guards acted in a manner that was contrary to the prison
guidelines.” (R., p.1124.) He concluded, “[t]hus, the guidelines were relevant to establish that
the prison officials possessed a motive to lie that their behavior was in compliance with the
guidelines. Such information would have undermined the credibility of their testimony and
therefore should have been admitted at trial.” (R., p.1124.)
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the district court asked how the prison
discipline and use of force policies would be “relevant to the question of whether or not the
defendant did . . . or did not commit the crime as charged?” (Tr., p.656, Ls.15-19.) The district
court thought, “if his position or his theory of the case was excessive force or self defense, then I
think that’s clearly relevant. But his position was not excessive force or self defense. His
position was ‘I didn’t do it.’” (Tr., p.656, Ls.20-25.)
Mr. Hayes’ counsel asserted, “his theory of the case was that I did not kick these guards
and his theory was that they beat me up and they violated their own policies, and if the jury knew
these policies, the jury would know that they had a motivation to lie about what happened.”
(Tr., p.657, Ls.3-8.) Counsel continued: “If the jury were made aware that their own internal
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policy says if we have inmates, who are yelling, upset, cursing at us, that they have the right to
do that. And we have a strict policy on what the use of force is when we respond to that.”
(Tr., p.657, Ls.18-22.) He stated, “[a]nd they did not follow those policies and they ultimately
take this man down to the ground. They claim that he kicks them. He claims that they are
violating their policies in doing so.” (Tr., p.657, Ls.22-25.) Counsel asserted, “[a]nd if it’s not
allowed for that information to be known by the jury, that it shields his ability to show that they
have a motivation to lie about it. That that is relevant evidence.” (Tr., p.657, L.25 – 658, L.4.)
The district court subsequently issued an Order Denying Motion for New Trial.
(R., pp.1263-78.) With respect to the district court preventing Mr. Hayes from impeaching the
State’s witnesses with the prison’s discipline and force policies, the district court wrote, “[t]he
Court found that the above-referenced testimony was irrelevant to the issues to be tried in this
case.” (R., pp.1274-75.)
The district court stated, “[t]he only issues involved whether or not the Defendant
committed the crimes charged, and whether there were any legally relevant defenses, such as
self-defense, excessive force, defense of others, consent, absence of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and any other relevant claims or defenses.”

(R., p.1275.)

The district court

acknowledged Mr. Hayes “never claimed self-defense or excessive force. Instead his defense
was that he did not batter the correctional officers at all—they battered him.” (R., p.1276 n.6.)
However, the district court determined, “[t]he so-called impeachment evidence sought to be
introduced by Defendant was collateral evidence and testimony that did not prove or tend to
prove the existence of a fact in issue, and was irrelevant and inadmissible.” (R., p.1275.) The
district court also determined, “the evidence, if relevant, was inadmissible as a waste of time,
confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.” (R., p.1275 (citing I.R.E. 403).)
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B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion of a new trial for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Ellington, 157 Idaho 480, 485 (2014). An appellate court reviews questions of relevancy
de novo. Radebaugh, 124 Idaho at 764. The appellate court will not disturb a district court’s
determination under Rule 403 unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Rawlings,
159 Idaho 498, 506 (2015).

C.

The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law When It Prohibited Mr. Hayes From
Asking The Correctional Officers Questions Related To The Prison Guidelines
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Hayes’ motion for a new trial,

on the basis the district court erred as a matter of law when it prohibited Mr. Hayes from asking
the correctional officers questions related to the prison guidelines for disciplinary proceedings
and infraction hearings.
At the time of the district court’s decision to deny the motion for a new trial, Idaho
Criminal Rule 34 provided, “[o]n the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment
and grant a new trial on any ground permitted by statute.” I.C.R. 34(a) (2017). I.C. § 19-2406
outlines the exclusive grounds for granting a motion for new trial. One of those grounds is,
“[w]hen the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of any
question of law arising during the course of the trial.” I.C. § 19-2406(5).
Here, the district court erred as a matter of law when it prohibited Mr. Hayes from asking
the correctional officers questions related to the prison guidelines for disciplinary proceedings
and infraction hearings, because the questions were relevant to the officers’ motive to lie, and the
questions were not inadmissible under Rule 403.
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1.

The District Court Erred When It Determined The Questions Related To The
Prison Guidelines Were Not Relevant, Because The Questions Were Relevant To
The Correctional Officers’ Motive To Lie

The district court erred when it determined the questions related to the prison guidelines
for disciplinary proceedings and infraction hearings were not relevant. The questions were
relevant to the correctional officers’ motive to lie.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal
defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This
guarantee is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of effective cross-examination in securing this right.” State v. Araiza,
124 Idaho 82, 91 (1993) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)). As the Araiza Court
discussed, the United States Supreme Court in Davis “held that the Sixth Amendment allows a
defendant to inquire on cross-examination into potential bias or motive of a witness.” Id. The
Araiza Court continued: “Davis held that in order to give meaning to the right to confront
witnesses, the defendant must be permitted to do more than merely ask whether a witness is
biased, but must be allowed to show why the witness might be biased by presenting the facts
necessary to allow the jurors to form inferences regarding the witness’ impartiality.” Id. (citing
Davis, 415 U.S. at 319).
Further, the United States Supreme Court in Davis “recognized that the bias, prejudice, or
motive of a witness to lie concerning issues presented in a trial is always material and relevant to
effective cross-examination.” Id. (citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 316). In the words of the Davis
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Court, “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of
the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17.
The United States Supreme Court later held, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as
the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see Araiza, 124 Idaho at 91. The Confrontation Clause
“guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Araiza, 124 Idaho at 91.
In this case, the district court deprived Mr. Hayes of the opportunity for effective crossexamination by prohibiting him from questioning the correctional officers regarding the prison
guidelines disciplinary proceedings, infraction hearings, and the use of force. As Mr. Hayes
asserted before the district court, he “had argued that he was the victim of the prison’s battery
against him. In other words, he sought to argue that the prison guards acted in a manner that was
contrary to the prison guidelines.” (See R., p.1124.) As Mr. Hayes asserted, “the guidelines
were relevant to establish that the prison officials possessed a motive to lie that their behavior
was in compliance with the guidelines.” (See R., p.1124.)
The district court prevented all inquiry, through cross-examination of the officers, into
the possibility the officers had a motive to lie as a result of their desire to cover up their violation
of the prison guidelines during the incident. The district court determined the questions were not
relevant because Mr. Hayes had not raised a self-defense or excessive force affirmative defense.
(See R., p.1275; Tr., p.656, Ls.20-24.) However, the motive of a witness to lie is always material
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and relevant to effective cross-examination. See Araiza, 124 Idaho at 91 (citing Davis, 415 U.S.
at 316). Thus, the district court erred when it determined the questions were not relevant.

2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Determined The Questions On
The Prison Guidelines Were Inadmissible Under Rule 403

The district court abused its discretion when it determined, under Rule 403, that the
questions on the prison guidelines, even if relevant, were inadmissible for being a waste of time,
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Contrary to the district court’s determination (see
R., p.1275), the probative value of the questions was not substantially outweighed by a danger of
wasting time, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Thus, the district court did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards.6
The probative value of the questions was not substantially outweighed by a danger of
wasting time, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. See I.R.E. 403 (2017). The district
court here simply determined, “the evidence, if relevant, was inadmissible as a waste of time,
confusing the issues, and misleading the jury,” without explaining its reasoning.

(See

R., p.1275.) But an inquiry into whether the officers had a motive to lie because they did not
comply with the prison guidelines would not have been a waste of time, considering credibility
was a key issue, and exploring the officers’ motive to lie would have helped the jury weigh the
veracity of their testimony. Nor would the inquiry have confused the issues or misled the jury:
the central issue for the jury remained whether Mr. Hayes had committed a battery on the
officers, or whether the officers instead committed a battery on Mr. Hayes. (See, e.g., Tr., p.178,

6

At the time of the district court’s decision to deny the motion for a new trial, Rule 403
provided: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
I.R.E. 403 (2017).
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Ls.17-21.) Thus, the probative value of the questions was not substantially outweighed by a
danger of wasting time, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. The district court abused its
discretion when it determined the questions were inadmissible under Rule 403, because it did not
act consistently with the applicable legal standards.
In sum, the district court erred as a matter of law when it prohibited Mr. Hayes from
asking the correctional officers questions related to the prison guidelines for disciplinary
proceedings, infraction hearings and the use of force, because the questions were relevant to the
officers’ motive to lie, and the questions were not inadmissible under Rule 403. Thus, the
district court should have granted Mr. Hayes’ motion for a new trial with respect to the questions
related to the prison guidelines. The district court’s order denying his motion for a new trial on
that issue should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Hayes respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
his motion for a new trial with respect to the prison guidelines issue, and remand his case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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